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A secret sharing scheme is a cryptographic protocol to distribute a secret state in an encoded
form among a group of players such that only authorized subsets of the players can reconstruct
the secret. Classically, efficient secret sharing schemes have been shown to be induced by matroids.
Furthermore, access structures of such schemes can be characterized by an excluded minor relation.
No such relations are known for quantum secret sharing schemes. In this paper we take the first steps
toward a matroidal characterization of quantum secret sharing schemes. In addition to providing a
new perspective on quantum secret sharing schemes, this characterization has important benefits.
While previous work has shown how to construct quantum secret sharing schemes for general access
structures, these schemes are not claimed to be efficient. In this context the present results prove
to be useful; they enable us to construct efficient quantum secret sharing schemes for many general
access structures. More precisely, we show that an identically self-dual matroid that is representable
over a finite field induces a pure state quantum secret sharing scheme with information rate one.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd; 03.67.Pp
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I. INTRODUCTION
Secret sharing is an important cryptographic primi-
tive originally motivated by the need to distribute se-
cure information among parties some of whom are un-
trustworthy [3, 25]. Additionally, it finds applications in
secure multi-party distributed computation [2, 6]. Se-
cret sharing schemes have a rich mathematical struc-
ture [19] and they have been shown to be closely as-
sociated to error correcting codes [6, 20, 26] and ma-
troids [1, 4, 6, 10, 24, 28]. The interplay with these
objects has enabled us to obtain new insights not only
about secret sharing schemes but codes and matroids as
well. Although relatively new, the field of quantum secret
sharing [13] has made rapid progress both theoretically
[5, 7, 11, 14, 15, 22, 31] and experimentally [9, 16, 17, 29].
However, its connections with other mathematical disci-
plines have not been as well studied. In particular, no
connections have been made with the theory of matroids,
which is in sharp contrast to the classical scenario. These
connections are of more than theoretical interest. Classi-
cally, optimal secret sharing schemes i.e. those with infor-
mation rate one, are induced by matroids. Additionally,
matroids provide alternate methods to prove bounds on
the rates that can be achieved for certain access struc-
tures. For all these reasons it is useful to develop the
theory of matroids and quantum secret sharing schemes.
In this paper it is our goal to bring into bearing the the-
ory of matroids to characterize quantum secret sharing
schemes. While our results are only the first steps toward
this characterization, they do indicate the usefulness of
such associations. This paper is organized as follows. We
begin with a brief review of the necessary background in
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secret sharing. In Section II we review some of the known
results on classical secret sharing schemes and matroids;
these results are not well known in the quantum informa-
tion community and also provide the backdrop for gen-
eralizing the connections between matroids and secret
sharing schemes. In Section III we prove the central re-
sult of this paper, namely how representable identically
self-dual matroids lead to efficient quantum secret shar-
ing schemes. We assume that the reader is familiar with
the basic results on quantum computing and stabilizer
codes.
A. Classical secret sharing
A secret sharing scheme is a protocol to distribute a
secret s among a set of players P , by a dealer D, such
that only authorized subsets of P can reconstruct the se-
cret. Subsets of P which cannot reconstruct the secret
are called unauthorized sets. The access structure Γ con-
sists of all subsets that can reconstruct the secret. The
adversary structure A consists of all unauthorized sub-
sets. Any access structure Γ is required to satisfy the
monotone property i.e. if A ∈ Γ, then any set B ⊇ A
is also in Γ. This is the only restriction on the access
structures for classical secret sharing schemes. Any ac-
cess structure satisfying the monotone property can be
realized by an appropriate secret sharing scheme albeit
with large complexity, see for instance [28]. A secret shar-
ing scheme is said to be perfect if the unauthorized sets
cannot extract any information about the secret. A pre-
cise information theoretic formulation can be given that
quantifies this condition. We typically require the secret
to be taken from a finite alphabet, S. The shares dis-
tributed need not be in the same domain as the secret;
in fact each share can be in a domain of different alpha-
bet. Let the domain of the ith party be Si. An important
2metric of performance for secret sharing schemes is the
information rate ρ which is defined as
ρ = min
i
dim S
dim Si
. (1)
Secret sharing schemes with ρ = 1 are said to be ideal.
The associated access structure is said to be ideal. More
generally if an access structure can be realized with in-
formation rate one for some secret sharing scheme, then
it is said to be ideal. Note that we do not restrict the
dimension of the secret in this case. An important prob-
lem of secret sharing is to construct ideal secret sharing
schemes for any given (monotone) access structure. Not
every access structure can be realized with information
rate of one.
B. Quantum secret sharing
A quantum secret sharing scheme generalizes the clas-
sical one in two possible ways. We use quantum states to
share either a secret quantum state or a classical secret.
Some authors refer to the first case as quantum state
sharing, reserving the term “quantum secret sharing” to
situations where the secret is shared in an adversarial
setting. Though this might be preferable in some con-
texts, we will continue to use the traditional terminology.
Quantum secret sharing schemes for classical secrets were
introduced by Hillery et al in [13]. They also proposed
schemes for sharing quantum secrets, however these are
not perfect i.e., unauthorized sets can extract some in-
formation about the secret. Cleve et al [5] proposed the
first perfect quantum secret sharing schemes for quantum
secrets. The theory of quantum secret sharing was devel-
oped further making important connections to quantum
coding theory in [5, 11] and quantum information theory
in [14, 22] and more recently to graphs via labelled graph
states in [7].
In this paper we are concerned with the sharing of
quantum secrets. Unlike classical secret sharing schemes
a quantum secret sharing scheme cannot realize every
monotone access structure. An additional constraint due
to the “no-cloning theorem” [8, 30] has to be imposed on
a realizable access structure. Recall that the no-cloning
theorem states that an arbitrary quantum state cannot
be copied. In any quantum secret sharing scheme we
cannot have two disjoint authorized sets in the access
structure as this would violate the no-cloning theorem.
This condition in conjunction with the monotonicity of
access structure determines the allowed access structures
for all quantum secret sharing schemes [11, Theorem 8].
The same condition has been stated in different forms in
the literature. We record this result in its various forms
for future use. First we need the notion of dual of a set.
Let P be a set, then we denote the powerset of P as 2P .
For any subset A ⊆ 2P , we define the dual of A as
A∗ = {x ⊂ P | x 6∈ A}. (2)
Lemma 1 (Self-orthogonal access structures). Let Γ be
the access structure and A the adversary structure of
a quantum secret sharing scheme. Then the following
statements are equivalent.
A ∩B 6= ∅ for all A,B ∈ Γ (3)
Γ ⊆ Γ∗ (4)
A∗ ⊆ A (5)
Proof. We shall show that (3) ⇒ (4). It follows that if
A ∈ Γ, then A 6∈ Γ as A ∩ A = ∅. But Γ∗ = {B | B 6∈
Γ}. Since A 6∈ Γ it follows that A ∈ Γ∗ and Γ ⊆ Γ∗.
Conversely, let Γ ⊆ Γ∗. Then from the definition of Γ∗,
it follows that for any A ∈ Γ, we must have A 6∈ Γ i.e.
A ∈ A. Further all subsets of A are also in A. Now
assume that there exists some B ∈ Γ such that A∩B = ∅.
Then B ⊆ A. But all subsets of A ∈ A i.e. they are not
in Γ which contradicts that B ∈ Γ. Therefore there exists
no subset B ∈ Γ such that A ∩ B = ∅ proving that (4)
⇒ (3).
Now we shall show that (4) ⇔ (5). Assume that (4)
holds. Then since Γ∩A = ∅ and Γ∪A = 2P = Γ∗ ∪A∗,
we have that A = (Γ∗ ∪ A∗) \ Γ = (Γ∗ \ Γ) ∪ A∗, where
we used the fact that Γ∗ ∩ A∗ = ∅ and Γ ⊆ Γ∗. It now
follows that A∗ ⊆ A and (5) holds. Now assume that
(5) holds, then again we have Γ ∪ A = Γ∗ ∪ A∗ and this
time we can write Γ∗ = (Γ∪A) \A∗ = (Γ∗ \Γ)∪A∗ and
therefore Γ∗ ⊇ Γ and (4) holds.
We often refer to an access structure that is realizable
by a quantum secret sharing scheme as a quantum access
structure. Smith [27, Theorem 1] characterized the ad-
versary structure of quantum secret sharing schemes as
in (5). Condition (4) is somewhat reminiscent of the re-
quirement for self-orthogonal classical codes for quantum
error correction. If Γ = Γ∗, then we say that the access
structure is self-dual.
A quantum secret sharing scheme which encodes a pure
state secret into a global pure state is said to be a pure
state scheme and a mixed state scheme if it encodes into
a global mixed state. Self dual access structures can be
realized by pure state schemes, where as non-self-dual
access structures can be realized only as mixed state
schemes. A theorem [11, Theorem 3] due to Gottesman
shows that every mixed state scheme can be derived from
a pure state scheme. So we do not lose any generality by
focussing on the pure state schemes. The simplest access
structures are the ((k, n)) threshold access structures—in
this case, the authorized sets are any subset of size ≥ k
and unauthorized sets are subsets of cardinality less than
k. Smith [27] and independently Gottesman [11] showed
how to construct quantum secret sharing schemes with
general access structures.
In studying general access structures it is often conve-
nient to work with the minimal access structures, which
are the generating sets of the access structures. We define
the minimal access structure Γm of the access structure
Γ as
Γm = {A ∈ Γ | B 6⊂ A for any B ∈ Γ}. (6)
3If every party in P occurs in at least one minimal au-
thorized set of Γ, then we say that the access structure
is connected. We restrict our attention to such access
structures in this paper. Our primary goal in this pa-
per is to explore connections of quantum secret sharing
schemes with matroids and characterizing the associated
access structures in terms of matroids if it is possible. We
also address the construction of secret sharing schemes.
Our constructions make use of CSS codes reminiscent of
the constructions of Smith for general access structures.
II. MATROIDS AND SECRET SHARING
Matroids have been associated to secret sharing
schemes [4, 6], also see [28] for a brief overview of some of
the main results. Such schemes which are induced by a
matroid are called matroidal. Useful results with respect
to characterization and performance of secret sharing
schemes can be derived by means of such an association,
[1, 4]. Also, such an association also implies an implicit
correspondence between matroids and access structures.
In fact, classically, most of the associations focus on this
correspondence and tend to ignore the scheme realizing
the access structure. By far we do same however, since
a given access structure might not be a quantum access
structure we do bear in mind that we cannot entirely ig-
nore the fact that the access structure is being realized
through a quantum scheme. It is important to note that
not every secret sharing scheme can be associated to a
matroid.
A. Matroids
First we recall a few facts about matroids, readers in-
terested in a comprehensive introduction to matroids can
refer to [21].
A set V and C ⊆ 2V form a matroid M(V, C) if and
only if the following conditions hold. For any A,B ∈ C
and A 6= B
M1) A 6⊆ B.
M2) If x ∈ A ∩ B, then there exists a C ∈ C such that
C ⊆ (A ∪B) \ {x}.
We say that V is the ground set and C the set of circuits
of the matroid. A proper subset of any circuit is said to
be independent while a set containing any circuit is said
to be dependent. With every matroid we define a non-
negative integer valued function called the rank function
rk : V → N as
rk (X) = |I|, (7)
where I ⊆ X ⊆ V is a maximal independent subset of
X . A matroid is said to be (linearly) representable over a
field F if the ground set can be identified with the columns
of a matrix (over F) and the circuits with the minimal de-
pendent columns of the matrix. In this paper we are only
interested in finite fields. We can also define matroids in
terms of their bases, which are maximal independent sets
of V . A set V and B ⊆ 2V form a matroid M(V,B) if
and only if the following conditions hold.
B1) B 6= ∅.
B2) If B1, B2 ∈ B such that x ∈ B1 \ B2, then there
exists a y ∈ B2 \B1 such that (B1 \ x) ∪ {y} ∈ B.
Given a matroid M(V,B) we define its dual matroid
M(V,B)∗ as the matroid with ground set V and bases
B∗ = {V \B | B ∈ B} i.e. M(V,B)∗ =M(V,B∗).
B. Secret sharing schemes from matroids
Given a matroid M we can associate a secret sharing
scheme toM(V, C). We assume that the ground set of the
matroid is given by V = {0, 1, . . . , n− 1, n}. We identify
one of the elements of the ground set, say i ∈ V , as the
dealer and then list all the circuits of M that contain i.
Let this be denoted as
Γi,m = {C | C ∪ i ∈ C}. (8)
Consider the access structure given by
Γi = {A | V ⊇ A ⊇ C for some C ∈ Γi,m}. (9)
We can easily verify that Γi is a monotonic and that
its minimal access structure is given by Γi,m. Since any
monotonic access structure can be realized as a secret
sharing scheme every matroid defines an access structure.
This result is stated in the following fact, see [6].
Fact 1. Every matroid M(V, C) induces an access struc-
ture Γi as defined in equation (9).
Please note that the above association is in a sense
nonconstructive, it does not specify how to derive the
associated secret sharing scheme; it merely states that
there exists a secret sharing scheme that can realize the
induced access structure Γi. Further, depending on which
element of the ground set of the matroid is identified as
the dealer, we may obtain many schemes with possibly
different access structures from the same matroid.
A natural question that we are faced with is how to
make this association constructive and determine the
bounds on the information rate of the resulting access
structure. Brickell and Davenport [4] showed that if the
matroid is representable over a finite field [32], then we
obtain ideal secret sharing schemes and access structures.
However, if the matroid is not representable, then we
can no longer be certain if the matroid induces an ideal
secret sharing scheme. Seymour proved that there exist
non-representable matroids which cannot induce an ideal
secret sharing scheme [24], while Simonis and Ashikhmin
[26] showed that there exist non-representable matroids,
such as the non-Pappus matroid, which induce ideal
schemes. However, these latter matroids—while not af-
fording a linear representation—can be multilinearly rep-
resented. Matroids which induce ideal access structures
are called ss-representable matroids [18]. They may not
be linearly representable.
4C. Matroids from secret sharing schemes
Given that we can obtain secret sharing schemes from
matroids, we could ask if the converse is possible. As we
mentioned earlier, such a correspondence does not exist
for all secret sharing schemes. We review some of the re-
lated work in this context. The correspondence between
the matroids and secret sharing schemes naturally im-
plies that the access structure is associated to the circuits
of the matroid. This association could involve the scheme
explicitly. However a result due to Martin [19], see also
[28], shows that we can associate the access structure to a
matroid independently of the scheme used to realize that
structure. This involves a function, say f , defined on the
space of access structures; f maps an access structure to
an ordered pair, which may or may not be a matroid. If
f(Γ) is a matroid, then we say that Γ is matroid-related.
The minimal access structure will play a more important
role in this regard. As usual we denote by P the set of
participants and by D the dealer. Define the extended
access structure Γe = {A∪D | for all A ∈ Γm}. Further
let
J(A,B) = A ∪B \
(⋂
C∈Γe:C⊆A∪B
C
)
(10)
CΓ =
{
minimal sets of J(A,B) for
all A,B ∈ Γm and A 6= B
}
. (11)
We let f(Γ) = (P ∪D, CΓ). If CΓ satisfies the axioms M1
and M2, then we associate Γ to the matroid MΓ whose
ground set is P ∪D and the set of circuits are given by
CΓ i.e.
MΓ =M(P ∪D, CΓ). (12)
This definition of the matroid is in terms of the cir-
cuits that can be formed from the ground set. We could
always define a structure from the secret sharing scheme,
equivalently its access structure, as above but the result-
ing structure is not necessarily a matroid. It is a matroid
only under certain conditions. Only when (P ∪ D, CΓ)
induce a matroid we say that Γ is matroid related.
Classically an access structure induces a matroid only
when it satisfies certain conditions. Before we can state
this condition precisely we need the notion of minors. Let
Γ be an access structure, then we define two operations
of deletion and contraction, which we denote by “\” and
“/” respectively. Given a set Z ⊆ P we define
Γ \ Z = {A ⊆ P \ Z | A ∈ Γ}, (13)
Γ/Z = {A ⊆ P \ Z | A ∪ Z ∈ Γ}. (14)
An access structure Γ′ derived from Γ through a sequence
of deletions and contractions is called a minor of Γ. A
result by Seymour [23] shows that the access structures
are matroid related if the access structure satisfies a for-
bidden minor relation.
Lemma 2 (Seymour). An access structure Γ ⊆ 2P is
matroid related if and only if it does not have the follow-
ing minors:
a. Γa = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}}
b. Γb = {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}}
c. Γc = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3, 4}}
d. Γd = {{1, . . . , s}, {1, s+ 1}, . . . , {s, s+ 1}}
where P = {1, . . . , 4} except in d where P = {1, . . . s, s+
1} and s ≥ 3.
Please note that in the preceding result, the mini-
mal access structures are given rather than the complete
access structure. Seymour originally stated this result
in terms of matroid ports. The reformulation we have
given here in terms of the access structures is due to
Mart´ı-Farre´ and Padro´ [18]. This result together with
Lemma 1 immediately provides us with a criterion as to
which quantum access structures can be induced by ma-
troids.
Self-orthogonality, however, is not a property inher-
ited by minors of access structures. For instance con-
traction does not always preserve the self-orthogonality
of the access structures. Consider the following (mini-
mal) access structure: Γ = {{1, 2, 3}, {2, 3, 4}, {3, 4, 5}}.
Then Γ/3 = {{1, 2}, {2, 4}, {4, 5}}. In this case we have
two disjoint authorized sets; such an access structure
cannot be realized by a quantum secret sharing scheme
as it would lead to a violation of the no cloning theo-
rem. Therefore, it is not possible to determine a result
similar to Lemma 2 for self-orthogonal access structures
i.e. the forbidden minors for access structures that are
self-orthogonal. Incidentally, there exist other important
classes of matroids such as transversal matroids which
are not minor closed.
Brickell and Davenport [4, Theorem 1] showed that ev-
ery classical ideal access structure induces a matroid. In
figures 1 and 2 we summarize the relation between per-
missible access structures, matroidal access structures,
and ideal access structures for classical schemes and
quantum schemes. We do not know if every access struc-
ture that is realized by an ideal quantum secret sharing
scheme induces a matroid. Therefore we show that the
set of ideal quantum access structures does not lie en-
tirely in the set of matroidal access structures in figure 2.
III. RELATING MATROIDS AND QUANTUM
SECRET SHARING
A. Matroidal quantum secret sharing schemes
In this section we present the central result of our pa-
per, Theorem 4. It shows that a class of matroids induce
ideal pure state quantum secret sharing schemes. First
we need the following preliminaries. We say a matroid is
self-dual if it is isomorphic to its dual matroid. If it is
equal to its dual matroid then we say it is an identically
self-dual (ISD) matroid.
5Classical access structures
Matroidal Ideal
FIG. 1: Relation between ideal, matroidal and general classi-
cal access structures
Quantum access structures
Matroidal
Ideal
FIG. 2: Relation between ideal, matroidal and general quan-
tum access structures. It is possible that all ideal quantum
access structures are also matroidal.
Fact 2. Let Γi and Γ
d
i be the access structures induced by
a matroid M(V, C) and its dual matroid M∗ by treating
the ith element as the dealer. Then we have
Γdi = Γ
∗
i (15)
Fact 2 was stated in [6]. Together with Lemma 1,
and the fact that every self-dual access structure can be
realized as a pure state scheme [11, Theorem 8], it implies
the following result, stated explicitly due to its relevance
for us.
Corollary 3. An identically self-dual matroid M in-
duces a pure state quantum secret sharing scheme.
However, the preceding result does not give us a
method to construct a quantum secret sharing scheme
from the matroid, neither does it tell us if the scheme is
ideal. The following theorem gives the general procedure
to transform a representable identically self-dual matroid
into a quantum secret sharing scheme. We denote a finite
field with q elements as Fq. Following standard notation,
we use [n, k, d]q to denote a classical code over Fq and
[[n, k, d]]q to denote a quantum code over Fq. If C is a
code, we denote a generator matrix of C byGC . The code
obtained by deleting the ith coordinate of C is called a
punctured code of C and denoted as ρi(C). Suppose we
consider the subcode of C with the ith coordinate zero,
then the code obtained by puncturing the ith coordinate
of the subcode is called a shortening of C and denoted
as σi(C). We have the following useful relations between
the punctured and shortened codes and their duals.
σi(C) ⊂ ρi(C) and σi(C)
⊥ = ρi(C
⊥). (16)
If x ∈ Fnq , then we denote the support of x as supp(x) =
{i | xi 6= 0}. A codeword x in C is said to be a mini-
mal support if there exists no nonzero codeword y in C
such that supp(y) ( supp(x). If in addition its leftmost
nonzero component is 1, then it is said to be a mini-
mal codeword. Minimal codewords were introduced by
Massey [20]. They facilitate the study of classical secret
sharing schemes, especially in characterizing the access
structures.
Theorem 4. LetM(V, C) be an identically self-dual ma-
troid representable over a finite field Fq, where V =
{0, 1, . . . , n − 1, n}. Suppose that C ⊆ Fn+1q such that
the generator matrix of C is a representation of M. Let
GC =
[
1 g
0 Gσ0(C)
]
and Gρ0(C) =
[
g
Gσ0(C)
]
. (17)
Then there exists an ideal pure state quantum secret shar-
ing scheme Σ on P = {1, . . . , n} whose access struc-
ture Γ0 and minimal access structure Γ0,m, are defined
by equations (9) and (8) respectively. The encoding for
Σ is determined by the stabilizer code with the stabilizer
matrix given by
S =
[
Gσ0(C) 0
0 Gρ0(C)⊥
]
. (18)
The reconstruction procedure for an authorized set A is
the transformation on S such that the encoded operators
for the transformed stabilizer code are X1 = X ⊗ I⊗
n−1
and Z1 = Z ⊗ I⊗
n−1
.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is structured as follows.
Since Σ relies on the encoding of the stabilizer code de-
rived from S, we first show that S defines a stabilizer
code and identify certain properties of the codes C and
C⊥ essential to recovering the secret. Then we show that
if the secrets are encoded using the stabilizer encoding,
then an element A ∈ Γ0,m does correspond to a mini-
mal authorized set by explicitly reconstructing the secret
with the shares in A and proving that no proper subset
of A can reconstruct the secret.
Encoding the secret: We can easily check that the matrix
given in equation (18) does define a stabilizer code. We
see that σ0(C) is an [n, k − 1, d]q code, while ρ0(C) is
an [n, k, d − 1]q code with σ0(C) ⊂ ρ0(C). Therefore
we have ρ0(C)
⊥ ⊂ σ0(C)
⊥ ensuring the orthogonality of
σ0(C) and ρ0(C)
⊥ in equation (18). The dimension of S
6is given by k − 1 + n − k = n − 1. Thus S defines an
[[n, 1, d′]]q quantum code, Q.
SinceM(V, C) is an identically self-dual matroid, both
C and C⊥ represent M(V, C). Therefore, g 6= 0, oth-
erwise the zeroth column would be all zero in C⊥ which
would mean that {0} is a circuit, while from C, we would
conclude that {0} is independent and not a circuit; a con-
tradiction. Furthermore, without loss of generality we
can choose (1|g) to be a minimal codeword c in C [33].
As the support of a minimal codeword in C is a cir-
cuit of M(V, C), it follows that there exists a minimal
codeword c′ in C⊥ such that supp(c′) = supp(c), in
particular there exists a vector (β|βg′) ∈ C⊥ such that
supp(βg′) = supp(g) for some β ∈ F×q and g
′ ∈ ρ0(C⊥).
The mapping for the secret sharing scheme is given as
follows:
|s〉 7→
∑
x∈σ0(C)
|s · g + x〉, where s ∈ Fq. (19)
Encoding of an arbitrary secret state follows by linearity
of the encoding map. The encoded X operator for the
quantum code is given by X = ⊗ni=1X
gi , or equivalently
[ g 0 ], its representation over F2nq .
Recovering the secret: Let A ∈ Γ0,m, then A ∪ {0} ∈
C and there exists a minimal codeword c′ ∈ C⊥ such
that supp(c′) = A ∪ {0}. Let c′ be a minimal codeword
in C⊥ such that c′0 = 1. We know that there exists a
c ∈ C such that supp(c) = supp(c′). We can choose
c0 = 1 since C is a linear code. Then, we have ρ0(c) 6∈
σ0(C). Then both ρ0(c) and g are in the same coset of
σ0(C) in ρ0(C). This holds because the cosets of σ0(C)
in ρ0(C) are in one to one correspondence with the cosets
of [0|σ0(C)] in C. The various coset representatives are
given by (α|αg), α ∈ Fq. Two coset representatives r, r
′
represent the same coset if and only if r0 = r
′
0. Therefore
all the minimal codewords c, with c0 = 1 are in the same
coset as (1|g). From this follows that ρ0(c) is in the same
coset as (g). Therefore, the state |s〉 might as well be
given by
|s〉 7→
∑
x∈σ0(C)
|s · ρ0(c) + x〉. (20)
Denote the columns of Gσ0(C) by si, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Since c′ ∈ C⊥, we have
GC(c
′)t =
[
1 c1 c2 . . . cn
0 s1 . . . sn
]
1
c′1
...
c′n

 = 0.
The above equation can also be written as
[
c1 c2 . . . cn
s1 . . . sn
]
−c′1
...
−c′n

 = [ 1
0
]
.
In other words, there exists a linear combination of the
columns of Gσ0(C) such that∑
i∈supp(ρ0(c′))
c′isi = 0. (21)
Now let us rewrite the stabilizer and the encoded X op-
erator as follows.
[
X
S
]
=

 ρ0(c
′) 0
Gσ0(C) 0
0 Gρ0(C)⊥


=

 c1 · · · cl 0 · · · 0 0s1 · · · sn 0
0 r1 · · · rn

 ,
where, without loss of generality, we can assume that
ρ0(c
′) and therefore ρ0(c) have support in the first l
columns only, i.e., ci 6= 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ l, and that ci = 0
for i > l, where 1 ≤ l ≤ n. Note that l ≥ 1 because we
must have c ·c′ = 0 and l = 0 implies that (1|0) ·(1|0) = 0
which is clearly not possible.
Let us transform the first column of S as per equa-
tion (21) i.e., s1 7→
∑
i∈supp(ρ0(c′))
c′isi. Then we obtain
 1 c2 · · · cl 0 · · · 0 00 s2 · · · sn 0
0 r1 r˜2 · · · r˜l rl+1 · · · rn

 .
Therein, the columns r2 to rl are transformed in the Z-
part while only the first column is transformed in the X-
part. For binary schemes this involves only CNOT gates,
for nonbinary schemes, we have to use the generalized
CNOT gates [12]. Now let us transform the encoded X
operator to the trivial operator given by X1. This gives
us
 1 0 00 s˜2 · · · s˜l sl+1 · · · sn 0
0 0 r˜2 · · · r˜l rl+1 · · · rn


which is in the form
 1 0 00 S˜X 0
0 S˜Z

 .
The column r˜1 has to become zero because the stabilizer
must commute with the encoded X operator now given
by X1. The encoded secret has now been transformed as∑
x∈S˜X
|s〉|x〉 = |s〉
∑
x∈S˜X
|x〉
As can be seen above, the secret is completely disen-
tangled from the rest of the qubits. Furthermore, in all
these transformations we operated only on the qudits in
7the support of the minimal codeword. Thus the elements
of Γ0,m are authorized sets.
Minimality of Γ0,m: The sets in Γ0,m are minimal autho-
rized sets because a proper subset of supp(c′) is not in C
and all operators with their support in supp(c′) must lie
outside C(S), the centralizer of S. Such operators cannot
extract any information about the encoded state as they
correspond to detectable errors of the stabilizer code.
Completeness of Γ0: By Fact 2, the access structure
Γ0 is self-dual, therefore |Γ0| = 2n−1. But the comple-
ment of everyone of these authorized sets is unauthorized
set otherwise we would violate the no-cloning theorem.
Together these sets exhaust all the possible subsets of
{1, . . . , n}. Thus there are no more authorized sets out-
side the ones given in Γ0 and the quantum access struc-
ture is completely defined by Γ0.
Finally, the purity of Σ follows from the explicit encoding
procedure given. That Σ is ideal follows from the fact
that each share has the same dimension as the secret.
We note that the choice of which element in the ma-
troid is identified with the dealer is arbitrary. In The-
orem 4, for simplicity we have assumed that the first
element is the dealer. Further, we need the representa-
tion of the matroid before we can use it to construct the
scheme. It is still open if every identically self-dual ma-
troid can be realized as a self-dual code, [6]. However,
every self-dual code induces a identically self-dual ma-
troid. Consequently, we have the following corollary that
gives us many efficient pure state quantum secret sharing
schemes.
Corollary 5. Let C ⊆ Fnq be an [n + 1, k, d]q code such
that C⊥ = C with generator matrix GC given as
GC =
[
1 g
0 Gσ0(C)
]
and Gρ0(C) =
[
g
Gσ0(C)
]
. (22)
Then there exists an ideal pure state quantum secret shar-
ing scheme Σ on n parties whose minimal access struc-
ture is
Γ0,m =
{
supp(c) \ {0}
∣∣∣∣ c is a minimal codewordof C with c0 = 1
}
.
The encoding for Σ is determined by the stabilizer code
with the stabilizer matrix given by
S =
[
Gσ0(C) 0
0 Gρ0(C)⊥
]
. (23)
The encoding for a state |s〉, where s ∈ Fq, is given as
|s〉 7→
∑
x∈σ0(C)
|s · g + x〉. (24)
The reconstruction procedure for an authorized set A of
Σ is the transformation on S such that the encoded op-
erators for the transformed stabilizer are X1 and Z1.
B. An example
We now give an example to illustrate the construction.
Let us consider the extended Hamming code given by the
following generator matrix.
GC =


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0


We can check that C is self-dual. The punctured code
ρ0(C) and the shortened code σ0(C) are given by the
following generator matrices. (For clarity we show only
nonzero entries).
Gρ0(C) =


1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 0


Gσ0(C) =

 1 0 0 0 1 1 10 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 0


Now let us form a (CSS) stabilizer code with stabilizer
matrix as follows.
S =
[
Gσ0(C) 0
0 ρ0(C)⊥
]
=


1 0 0 0 1 1 1
00 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 0
0
1 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 0


For this stabilizer code the encoding for |0〉 and |1〉 is
given as follows:
|0〉 7→ |0000000〉+ |1000111〉+ |0101011〉+ |0011110〉
+ |1101100〉+ |1011001〉+ |0110101〉+ |1110010〉
|1〉 7→ |1111111〉+ |0111000〉+ |1010100〉+ |1100001〉
+ |0010011〉+ |0100110〉+ |1001010〉+ |0001101〉
Observe that |s〉 7→
∑
c∈σ0(C)
|s · X + c〉, where X is
in σ0(C)
⊥ \ σ0(C). Now consider a minimal codeword
c in C⊥ such that c0 = 1. One such codeword is
c = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1). Observe that (1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1|0)
i.e. X1X2X7 is an encoded operator for the stabilizer
code. The support of c is given by {0, 1, 2, 7}. The lin-
ear combination of the columns in the support of ρ0(c)
gives us (1, 0, 0, 0)t. If we computed the linear combina-
tion of the columns 1, 2, 7 into the first column we get
8the following action on stabilizer of the code.
S 7→


0 0 0 0 1 1 1
00 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 0
0
1 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 0


The encoded operator (1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1|0) maps to
(1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1|0). If we now transform the encoded
operator to (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0|0) the stabilizer gets further
transformed as
S 7→


0 0 0 0 1 1 1
00 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 0
0
0 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 0


Observe that this time only the Z part of the stabilizer
is transformed. Now the encoded secret is in the state
|s〉 (|000000〉+ |000111〉+ |101011〉+ |011110〉
+ |101100〉+ |011001〉+ |110101〉+ |110010〉)
The secret is completely disentangled from the rest of the
shares. Therefore, supp(c) \ {0} forms an authorized set.
The rest of the shares cannot reconstruct or extract any
information from their shares because of the no-cloning
theorem. Similarly any minimal codeword in C⊥ with
c0 = 1 defines an authorized set for the scheme. Suppose
that c is a minimal codeword with c0 = 0, then it must
be in σ0(C) and any other vector whose support is the
same must be in S or outside C(S), the centralizer of
S. No such operator can reveal any information about
the encoded secret since they are detectable errors of the
stabilizer code and by definition detectable errors reveal
nothing about the encoded information.
C. Discussion
The results in this section have important benefits.
Quantum secret sharing schemes for general access struc-
tures were proposed by Gottesman [11] and Smith [27],
based on monotone span programs. These constructions
are not optimal in general. Our method gives optimal
schemes with information rate one. However, not every
ideal quantum secret sharing scheme can be derived by
Theorem 4. For instance, the ((3, 5)) threshold scheme
can be realized using the [[5, 1, 3]] quantum code, but
it cannot be realized by the method proposed. Further-
more, the access structure of the ((3, 5)) scheme induces a
matroid. It would be worth investigating to find out how
such quantum schemes can derived from matroids. An-
other interesting question would be to derive ideal quan-
tum secret sharing schemes from non-representable ISD
matroids.
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